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The Supporters of Unification and
the Taiwanisation Movement
Feelings of emergency and a crisis mentality hover in the Blue camp
during the 2004 presidential election campaign
Stéphane Corcuff
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 The  spring  2004  presidential  election  in  Taiwan  seems  to  have  set  a  particular
milestone  in  the  process  launched  in  1986 of  liberalisation,  democratisation  and
democratic  consolidation1.  The  rival  camps  exchanged  wild  attacks  during  the
campaign; and a proportion of the losers, mostly supporters of unification with China,
staged  demonstrations  afterwards,  their  refusal  to  admit  defeat  bolstered  by  the
victors’  narrow  majority.  This  reaction,  by  its  nature  and  intensity,  expressed  the
camps’ disquiet over the long-term prospect of political eclipse, in the context of ever
deepening Taiwanisation.  Other demonstrators,  not  necessarily  pro-unification even
though they had voted for  what  is  known as  the  pan-Blue  (fanlan)  coalition2,  were
making a dramatic comment on Taiwan’s economic situation over the past four years.
Their view, which was extremely negative, was partly influenced by the opposition’s
electoral propaganda, given that the economic indicators had been showing positive
growth for seven months before the election. 
2 Taiwanese  democracy  has  certainly  survived  the  post-electoral  demonstrations,
described by former President Lee Teng-hui as “an attempted coup d'état”. But, with
the  passing  of  the  crisis,  the  question  posed  by  the  losers’  attitude  remains
unanswered: how stable are the democratic values of those unification supporters most
unhappy about Taiwanisation? For fifteen years they have been aware of the downward
trend of their political influence; and some of them now see in democracy itself a threat
to their cherished but time-worn ideal: unification between China and Taiwan. 
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3 This crisis is probably the first very significant obstacle to the democratisation process
launched 18 years ago. What does it tell us about the importance of identity in Taiwan’s
political development? What does it say about the stability of democracy in the island,
or about the loyalties of those who have the most to lose in the present transition but
who, with their political influence, could still thwart or hold back the policy followed
by the pro-independence campaigners now in power?
4 Despite the undeniable qualities of democracy, it is a form of government that, like the
others, does not create unanimity. In Taiwan, as elsewhere, democratic rule is regularly
attacked by those for whom democracy means loss of power. A youthful democracy, as
Taiwan’s is,  can  still  be  threatened  from  within,  even  when  it  appears  firmly
established. Historians of fascism and the twentieth century dictatorships have shown
that democracies are not always guaranteed to survive. From this lesson has arisen the
concept of “democratic consolidation”. 
5 This article analyses one of the underlying causes of the attacks made on democracy by
the Blues, implicitly and explicitly, both during and after the 2004 presidential election
campaign: the psychological factor, within the context of politics and identity. Only a
few references will be made to the campaign by the pro-independence camp, known as
the pan-Greens (fanlü)3. Indeed, the article concerns itself above all with the psychology
of the defeated. To this end, it asks two simple questions: how is it that the opponents
of the President could have wielded, with unfailing determination, arguments whose
polemical aspects were easy to spot, arguments that were passed on without critical
comment  by  many  media  and  that  so  many  people  found  convincing?  The  second
question follows on from the first: how firmly attached to democracy can these people
be, when they feel that present developments challenge their power and their ultimate
political aim, namely, the ideal of unification?
WHAT INDEPENDENCE?
According  to  one’s  angle  of  approach,  Taiwan’s  effective  independence  appears
quite differently: now absolute, now incomplete, now legal or now political. It is
perfectly clear that Taiwan is independent in reality: no other government than
that of the Republic of China has raised taxes or designated a leader in Taiwan since
1949. Most importantly, the independence of Taiwan exists in law; that is a legal
fact, though one that is strongly disputed: the government that holds power in the
island holds in its own hands the totality of attributes that international law and
doctrine prescribe as the sine qua non of formal sovereignty. People often contest
this  argument by citing Taiwan’s lack of  international  recognition:  they suggest
that Taiwan’s sovereignty exists, perhaps, de facto, but not de jure.
Yet,  this view may meet with objections. The first,  theoretical:  sovereignty is as
much a legal notion as political, and political as much as legal. Historically, this is
how the sovereign nation-state was defined in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It is
specious to distinguish the two notions, and basically rather illogical: is a sovereign
nation that is not recognised as such no longer sovereign? Such reasoning leads to
insoluble legal and political situations, as it has in Taiwan, which according to this
theory is in a legal vacuum that has nothing to do with its practical situation. 
A second objection is practical: even if international recognition were a necessary
legal  criterion  of  sovereignty,  Taiwan  would fulfil  this  condition.  It  would  be
enough for one tiny micro-state, a member of one single international organisation
requiring its members themselves to be considered sovereign states, to recognise
the island officially: this alone would satisfy the legal argument. And there do exist
about  thirty  sovereign  states,  members  of  the  United  Nations,  that  recognise
Taiwan. 
The third  objection is  legal:  international  law does  not  include the  criterion of
The Supporters of Unification and the Taiwanisation Movement
China Perspectives, 53 | May- June 2004
2
recognition among the elements  of  sovereignty—this  is  often forgotten.  Neither
recognition by one state  nor recognition by all  the states  nor admission to  the
United Nations constitutes an indispensable legal condition of sovereignty in the
external  order”;  and,  indeed,  the condition would be unmanageable.  How many
states  would  it  take,  recognising  another,  to  confer  sovereignty  upon  it?  Was
Switzerland deemed a sovereign state in fact but not in law over the decades during
which it was not a UN member? Unfortunately, the argument put up against Taiwan
is  at  best  an  imperfect  analysis  or  a  pseudo-legal  justification  of  a  political
argument that is necessarily debatable.
The  problem,  in  judging  whether  “independence”  and  “unification”  are  valid
alternatives,  is  even more complex if  we ask which government we are  talking
about. While Taiwan is definitely independent, it is so, in law, only as the Republic
of China, not as Taiwan. For the time being, the notion of Taiwan is political (and
historical, geographical, cultural, artistic...) but not yet clearly constitutionalised;
and  those  states  that  maintain  official  diplomatic  relations  with  the  island
recognise it as such. 
The  Republic  of  Taiwan  perhaps  exists  politically,  even  institutionally,  but  its
existence  at  the  strictly  constitutional  level  is  limited,  for  the  present,  to  the
“additional  articles  to  the  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  China”,  which
substantially modify the functioning of the 1947 Constitution without altering its
historical dispositions. Indeed, the constitutional reforms were not voted through
as amendments (xianfa xiuzheng an) but as articles additional to the Constitution
(xianfa  zengxiu  tiaowen);  they  were  added in  several  waves  since  1991;  and  this
solution avoided, for a while, having to change the Constitution, which would be a
politically risky reform. In no case has the state’s name been changed, and it is still
the Republic of China. In a word, Taiwan as such is certainly not independent in
law, being so only as the Republic of China. So, in this intricate situation, what does
it mean to say “the independence of Taiwan”? Independent of whom? Independent
of what? Independent of the People’s Republic of China? Certainly not, since Peking
has never governed the island since the PRC was founded on October 1st 1949. That
is  why  the  Taiwanese  pro-independence  movement  has  never  claimed
independence from the People’s Republic. From the Republic of China itself? That is
precisely what the pro-independence campaigners ask, because they perceive the
island’s  official  government  as  being  inherited  historically  from  that  which
governed on the mainland between October 1911 and December 1949, being in their
eyes unconnected with Taiwan’s history or with its present-day political reality.
Thus, the question is more about changing the name of the country (gai guohao) and
not about severing political connections with China, which have not existed for fifty
years.
6 Among the losers, there are some people today who think that democracy is merely a
tool in the hands of the ideologues building the Taiwanese nation. The validity of this
clear-cut view is, of course, worth examining; however, the idea that representative
democracy might be “captive” was not born in Taiwan and is not in the least bit new to
the debate on democracy: it even has a historical foundation, and a certain political
justification4.  Its seductive power, over those who have lost an election or who feel
themselves lastingly excluded from the democratic process, is all the greater. Thus, the
argument has cropped up again and again on Taiwan’s path to democracy. The leaders
of  the  Blue  camp  gave  this  idea  fresh  currency  during  their  speeches  to  the
demonstrators, after rejecting the results of the presidential poll on March 20th. 
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Stamped top left, ballot paper shows voter’s choice of pan-blue candidates
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7 Supporters of the policy of Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian find it quite
legitimate to harness democratic power to the aims of identity reform, on the grounds
that the past dictatorship imposed on Taiwan a Chinese identity, nationalist, uniform
and basically invented, an identity alien to the island and to its multi-cultural heritage;
that the Nationalists achieved this by coercive and sometimes violent methods; and,
lastly, that this policy has irremediably impaired the local cultures. There is, for many
of them, a sort of legitimate “revenge”, which the more moderate see as a necessary
restoration of a “balance” after the excesses of the past, in what is now called by some
“post-colonial” (houzhimin) phase of the republican Chinese government on Taiwan5.
8 On  the  other  hand,  those  who  feel  Taiwanisation  (bentuhua)  to  be  a  threat  to  the
island’s Chinese cultural heritage do not accept what they judge as the use of state
power  to  redefine  the  people’s  identity.  Inevitably,  their  critique  of  Taiwanisation
tends to slide into an attack on democracy itself; after all, it is democracy that, in three
successive elections by direct universal suffrage, in 1996, 2000 and 2004, has raised two
pro-independence Taiwanese men to the presidency6. The democratic process, which
gave expression to  a  long-suppressed Taiwanese identity,  went  on to  challenge the
categorically imperative status given (until Lee Teng-hui’s presidency began) to the aim
of  unification with China.  The question arises:  what  of  those  for  whom unification
remains the ultimate political goal, what feelings do they have towards the democratic
idea? For some people today,  there is  a real  opposition between the preference for
democracy and the preference for identity.
9 Since the early 1990s, the unifiers most opposed to Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen
Shui-bian have been condemning with equal  persistence what  they perceive as  the
dictatorship of the two democratic Presidents. But behind the rhetorical references to
democracy (minzhu tizhi) or to dictatorship (ducai tizhi), the thrust of their reproach is
really aimed at the objectives of this power, rather than at its extent. In Argentina, the
generals started denouncing the “creeping dictatorship” of the democratically elected
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President the day that he called them to account for the tortures inflicted under the
dictatorship they had imposed. Similarly, the most vehement critics of Presidents Lee
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian denounce presidential power all the more because they
no longer wield it themselves: the political logic is quite straightforward. They perceive
presidential power, even though it  is in fact quite limited7,  turned against them. In
former times, most of them supported the dictatorship, then quite real, of Chiang Kai-
shek’s “free China”. But, in fact, there is no contradiction here. The explanation for this
apparent inconsistency is that they are sticking to their aim of unification: a principle
maintained by the old regime but called into question by the new. And, for the same
reason, they support one and attack the other. There is nothing new, either, in their
opposition to Taiwanisation8. So it is hardly surprising that they should attribute their
growing  political  marginalisation,  in  a  changing  environment,  to  “personal
dictatorship”. 
10 The attacks  on a  Taiwanese  pro-independence campaigner  now in  power,  made by
unifiers  of  mainland  origins  feeling  their  influence  declining  irreversibly,  are
something more than the stale rhetoric of those losing out because of democratisation.
The attacks show the permanence of the unifiers’ loyalty to a basic value, unification
with China, whereas democracy remains a value that is non-essential (even though not
necessarily ornamental). 
11 The more radical of the unifiers have today a sense of urgency, linked to a question of
an existential nature: confronted by a strong historical force tending to marginalise
them and fence them in with contradictions  sharpened by the democratic  process,
what are their chances of political survival? The question is the more pressing since the
aim of unification between Taiwan and China is beginning to lose its sacred aura, not
merely in Taiwanese society but also within the mainlander population of Taiwan itself,
penetrated by an irrepressible movement towards identification with the island.
12 While the feelings of crisis and urgency among the leaders of the Blue camp do not
necessarily show through in the carefully worded replies to formal interview questions
at party headquarters in Taipei, they are evident at the local or central level to anyone
who can sound out the unifiers’ psychology, or to anyone who frequents mainlanders
with no political role, in their everyday private life. We would be wrong to imagine
that,  because  the  unifiers  have  also  been  “Taiwanised”  and  because  opinions  vary
within their camp, this feeling of crisis is restricted to the extremists alone or to the
older  generation.  The  sense  of  crisis  is  widely  shared.  The  shock of  Taiwanisation,
which might have been in some ways, and in spite of the psychological crisis they were
already experiencing at  that time,  dying away during the last  years of  Kuomintang
under  Lee  Teng-hui9,  is  today  a  renewed  source  of  unease  and  anxiety,  as  this
Taiwanisation  deepens,  as  it  normalises  the  pro-independence  leaders’  presence  in
power and as it allows the first pro-independence leader elected as head of state to be
returned for a second term.
13 To show how deep are these feelings of crisis and urgency, this article seizes upon a
particular political moment, a revealing moment, during which these complex feelings
reach a climax: the moment when the unifiers’ camp learned the news, on the evening
of Saturday March 20th, of its third electoral defeat since the presidential election of
1996, a moment that seemed to confirm its collapse for the duration. In our view, the
politicians of the Blue camp, who had difficulty in finding a common, coherent and
convincing  strategic  response  to  the  challenge  set  for  them  by  the  Taiwanisation
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movement, no longer had the initiative of the political calendar. To attempt to reverse
their  very delicate position in this  decisive phase of  Taiwan’s  history,  faced with a
Green camp now firmly in power (and a Green economic record that had improved just
before the start of the campaign and had robbed them of their main argument) they
now  launched  a  campaign  of  unexpected  but  predictable  violence,  playing  on  the
Chinese threat, appealing to the conspiracy theory and depicting Chen Shui-bian as a
dangerous dictator.
14 We are concerned firstly with the notion of identity, different interpretations of which
lead to radically different approaches to the question of Taiwan’s future. Then we shall
deal with the origins of the crisis by attempting to characterise a “mainland effect”,
sociological as much as political, even geopolitical, to demonstrate the importance of
the  mainlanders  in  Taiwan.  This  will  help  us  in  looking  for  the  basic  faultline  in
Taiwanese society on the question of identity: less “independence versus unification”
than “Chinese consciousness  versus  Taiwanese consciousness”.  We shall  see  what  a
complex form is taken by the national identification of the mainlanders in Taiwan, a
necessary  preliminary  to  understanding  the  supporters  of  unification  faced  with
ultimate defeat, the re-election of Chen Shui-bian: he was fairly elected, admittedly, but
in an unacknowledged three-cornered contest, and backed now by a higher vote than
in 2000.
15 During this year’s campaign, we have witnessed a real crisis of identity. The war of
words has been fierce beyond control, one camp desperate not to see Taiwan back in
the hands of a party suspected of appeasement towards China, and the other glimpsing
with unequalled anguish the possibility of annihilation. A fight to the death: a sadly
illuminating example can be cited, if one were needed, in the joy displayed by many
militants  in  the  Blue  camp when the  assassination attempt  on Chen Shui-bian was
announced. How did we reach that point?
16 If we attempt to reflect at the level of democratic theory, notably from the viewpoint of
transitology (i.e., the study of transitions to democracy and democratic consolidation),
the  central  question  posed  by  this  crisis  is:  what  are  the  prospects  for  Taiwanese
democracy  to  flourish  over  the  fifteen  years  ahead?  It  faces  three  formidable
challenges.
17 Firstly, there is the debate over identity within Taiwanese society, which is becoming
increasingly bitter. The elections force politicians on both sides to make choices and to
mark their preferences; they make people drop their masks; and they reveal, a little
more each time, the vertiginous depth of opposition between two visions of Taiwan’s
identity.  Then, there is  the pressure from the Chinese who, lacking the strength in
conventional  weapons  to  invade  the  island,  have  found  a  more  effective  strategic
solution in deploying an ever-growing number of  missiles;  while  the reality  of  this
threat  is  still  under  debate,  the  pressure  it  applies  is  like  lighting  a  fire  under  an
already boiling pot. And lastly, there is the veto from the international community,
which  is  unwilling  to  guarantee  Taiwan’s  security.  While  the  US  is  committed  to
defending the status quo, it will not support any change to it. As for the rest of the
world, it will not guarantee Taiwanese security in any circumstance, and frequently
reads  into  Taipei’s  sovereignty  discourse  a  vain  exercise  in  nation-state  building,
nineteenth century style, even a “Taiwanese nationalism” that it judges to be implicitly
dangerous  because  it  “provokes”  China.  This  judgement  is  understandable,  but  ill-
informed10. The point is, the international community’s strategy towards Taiwan has a
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direct political impact on the Taiwanese debate: it plays in favour of the supporters of
unification,  even  though  they  are  today  in  the  minority.  These  three  pressures
considerably reduce  the  margin  for  manoeuvre  for  the  island’s  leaders. The  latter
cannot change the country’s name (they would not have any national consensus, while
this decision would lead to a rejection by the international community); nor can they
submit  to  China  (being  the  elected  leaders  of  a  sovereign  country,  even  one  not
recognised as such, they could not win support for this political act in the democratic
context of Taiwan); and neither can they curb the debate over identity (because of the
risk of being accused of stifling democracy itself). Thus, the men and women involved
in Taiwan politics, in both camps, are in a delicate situation.
What do we mean by “identity”?
18 These  three  pressures  are  inextricably  linked  to  a  central  notion,  identity.  We
frequently  have  of  it,  by  default,  an  intuitive  perception, one that  turns  out  to  be
partially wrong: that of an identity-state (I am . . .), of an identity-having (I have . . .), or
of an identity-heritage (my roots are . . .). Yet, identity is neither a state, nor a having—
beyond  the  strict  genetic  baggage  with  which  we  come  into  this  world.  Where
identification can be analysed, identity is indescribable because it is an infinite process,
an ever ongoing process. Though this may be obvious to psychologists, anthropologists
and  quite  a  number  of  sociologists,  ordinary  people  have  an  instinctively  fearful
reaction  to  identity  change,  despite  the  fact  that  this  is  the  common  fate  of  all
mankind.  We  find  it  difficult  to  consider  our  identities  as  naturally  constructed,
evolving  and  pluralistic—I  am  necessarily  a  little  more  myself  today  than  I  was
yesterday; and this causes the transition of the national identity in Taiwan, like any
transition of identity, to be instinctively perceived as dangerous: something worryingly
unknown,  a  shake-up  of  the  established  order,  a  political  manipulation,  an
unacceptable loss of that state which, even so, is not identity, or of that “having” which
it will never be. 
19 The identity transition frightens those who, on the island of Taiwan, remain marked by
fifty  years  of  political  socialisation,  of  “Greater  China”  nationalism  and  who,
identifying themselves nevertheless with Taiwan at the everyday level, are not exempt
from contradictions. But these contradictions are quickly exploited by the supporters
of  unification,  and  they  have  a  political  cost.  On  the  one  hand,  the  supporters  of
unification  refuse  to  consider  the  elected  President  as  the  supreme and  legitimate
authority; they say the assassination attack was made “on Chen Shui-bian”, not “on the
President of the Republic”. On the other hand, in a second consequence that is just as
fundamental,  they  consciously  attempt  to  destabilise  this  President,  though he  has
been democratically elected and re-elected, to vent their frustrations and to enable
themselves to believe that the historical movement of which they are casualties is not
inevitable. 
20 The identity  transition  also  frightens  those,  on  the  mainland,  who have  convinced
themselves since 1949 that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, to the extent of its
becoming an essential element in the Chinese national psyche post 1949, whereas any
dispassionate analysis of history (to mention only this one approach) might bring one
to  challenge  many  such  certainties.  Did  not  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  itself
advocate the independence of Taiwan during the 1930s? Did not Mao Zedong himself,
before coming to power, recommend that China be divided into several more easily
manageable states?
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Counting the votes, 20 March: ballot is picked up by the first election officier, opened by a second,
read ans show to the public by a third, and finally recorded on a list in full view of public by a fourth
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21 Lastly, the identity transition frightens those in the international community who are
seduced by the status quo. This is still apparently the most convenient solution, in the
very short term, even though it would be challenged (the Taiwanese are excluded from
the UN; the Taipei government is well and truly sovereign; the consensus over Taiwan’s
Chinese identity, on which the status quo is historically based, has disappeared). 
22 Students of the Taiwanese question may easily agree in recognising that there exists a
debate  about  identity  in  Taiwan.  However,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish  its
various faultlines, or to identify one that would help us to distinguish the two camps on
a single essential point, more clearly and less arguably than the others.
The “Waishengren phenomenon” in Taiwan
23 Let us begin with the opposition between mainlanders and Taiwanese. The Waishengren
are those Chinese immigrants who arrived in Taiwan from various mainland provinces
between  1945  and  195511,  their  numbers  rising  to  a  peak  at  the  time  when  the
Nationalist  government  relocated  to  Taipei  in  December  1949.  Those  whom  we
currently call “the Taiwanese” are also of mainland origins, but older ones; their ethnic
makeup  is  equally  diverse:  Minnan  or  Hakka.  As  we  have  shown  in  an  earlier
contribution  to  this  review12,  the  building  of  an  ethnic,  political,  symbolic  and
psychological frontier between the two can be historicised: we can thus determine the
main  dates.  Obviously  we  are  not  concerned here  with  an  ancestral  or  immutable
frontier, but with one that was constructed. Many misunderstandings between the two
communities, and resentments on the part of the Taiwanese faced with mainlanders
monopolising power, developed over a forty-year period. Inter-communal marriages
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and the phenomenon of the military exodus from the villages13 have allowed a level of
adaptation to Taiwan of the values of everyday life, ways of living and language among
the mainlanders, whereas the first generation has gradually died out and the young
people born of mainland parents have no personal experience of China. Our own work
on the mainlanders, which was aimed at a statistical measurement of the phenomenon
of national identification, shows the unstoppable progress of adaptation to Taiwan that
permeates the daily life of the mainlanders; but nothing would justify the assertion that
the “provincial origin complex” (shengji qingjie) might have disappeared at all moments
of daily life, or even less in situations where politics are uppermost in people’s minds.
And it  reappears  regularly,  every time electoral  polls  force  mainland or  Taiwanese
electors to make choices. And let us not forget the power and influence that second
generation mainlanders kept for themselves, taking over from their elders in political
and  media  circles.  Admittedly,  these  younger  people  identify  far  more  than  their
parents  with  Taiwan,  but  they  certainly  have  not  abandoned  the  principle  of
unification. That principle takes a pounding, at the moment when the Taiwanese come
to power in their own land.
24 The mainlanders, a minority estimated at approximately 12% of the population, have
held onto power in a proportion far outweighing their numerical strength in the media,
the army, the administration and parliament. Their national identification is partly in
conflict with the movement towards the indigenisation of the political structures and
the ideology of Taiwan. There exists, then, a “Waishengren phenomenon” in Taiwanese
society and polity. But is this to say that the present conflict can be explained by a basic
opposition between  mainlanders  and  those  of  Taiwanese  origin?  If  that  were  true,
electoral behaviour would reflect it: we would note a massive vote by mainlanders for
mainlanders and for programmes stamped with the unifiers’ ideology; and a massive
vote by Taiwanese for Taiwanese and for pro-independence programmes. No trace of
such a clear dichotomy can be found. While 80% of mainlanders are reputed to vote for
mainland  candidates,  whose  policies  mostly  reflect  the  rejection  of  accelerated
Taiwanisation,  of  abandoning  the  Chinese  heritage  with  its  aim  of  unification,  the
opposite is not true among those of Taiwanese stock. While the latter did vote en masse
for candidates of Taiwanese stock, the mainlanders would have not had for a long time
the slightest political hope in the island. Consequently, while there undoubtedly does
exist  a  Waishengren  phenomenon  in  Taiwan,  the  faultline  does  not  lie  along  the
Waishengren-Taiwanese divide.
Independence or unification?
25 So, what about the independence/unification faultline and its bearing on the island’s
future? It is probably significant, just like the mainlanders/Taiwanese divide but, here
again, nothing indicates that it is the most important faultline. In reality, notions of
independence  or  unification  are  ambiguous.  In  theory,  there  should  not  be  any
opposition between, on the one hand, the choice of independence and, on the other,
that  of  unification.  Indeed,  there  would  be  a  problem  of  logic:  if  the  question  of
unification is being asked, then there must already be independence; if the question of
independence is being asked, how can it be offered at the same time as the option of
unification? The true opposition lies elsewhere, between the advocates of unification
(or of reunification) and those calling for a change in the country’s name (gai guohao):
from “Republic of China” to “Republic of Taiwan” ... among other possible choices.
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26 To characterise “unification” implies a choice between its various forms, and this is
where the divisions begin: under which government should the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait be unified? How soon? Under what conditions? Under the flag of the Republic of
China?  That  is  hardly  realistic,  given  the  disparity  of  force  between  the  two
sides―although the candidate Lien Chan wrote, during the campaign, that this would
be his option. Under the colours of the People’s Republic of China? That solution would
be difficult to sell to the Taiwanese, who live in a democracy and choose their own
sovereign leaders. Under a federation, to which both governments would sacrifice their
present  names?  It  might  be  a  viable  solution,  but  only  on  condition  that  the  two
governments accept  it.  The options being numerous,  and Taiwan being hardly in a
position to dictate terms, the advocates of unification are themselves divided. 
27 As for the pro-independence camp, the proposal to change the country’s name has,
seemingly, the merit of clarity.  But once the real debate begins over what name to
adopt,  the options are,  here again,  numerous.  Will  the choice reflect  a  desire for a
complete psychological break or, conversely, will it assert independence while seeking
a name acceptable to China? Will it be “Taiwan” (Taiwan guo), the “Republic of Taiwan”
(Taiwan gongheguo) or, for example, a “Chinese Republic of Taiwan” (Zhonghua Taiwan
minguo), the last solution being the least unacceptable for China? Furthermore, in the
pro-independence camp, not everyone supports changing the country’s name. Many
say that they would favour first changing the Constitution, so as to avoid providing
China with too easy a casus belli while allowing the main changes in practical terms;
that is the view of President Chen Shui-bian. The pro-independence camp is no more
unified over  the formal  aspects  of  independence than is  the unification camp over
those of unification14.  The independence/unification debate is,  indeed, an important
faultline but, like the earlier examples, does not lead us to a satisfactory clarification of
the real divide between the two sides.
“Chinese consciousness” and “Taiwanese consciousness”
28 Does there really exist a central faultline on which everything depends? Let us examine
a  final  opposition,  which  we  propose  here,  and  which  is  based  on  the  notion  of
consciousness. This notion, linked to ethnic identification (Waishengren/Taiwanese) as
well as to the choice offered for the island’s future (independence/unification), does
not,  however,  come down to either the one or the other,  and encompasses both of
them. Those putting this notion into words set “Chinese consciousness” (Zhongguo yishi)
against “Taiwanese consciousness (Taiwan yishi)15. This “consciousness”, which takes on
the clothing of an ideology16, is at the same time ethnic, cultural and political (in the
civic  sense).  You  might  say  of  someone  in  Taiwan  that,  for  example,  his  Chinese
consciousness “is very strong”: but he would not necessarily be a mainlander. He could
even possibly be against unification (or against unification at any price)—but would
probably  not  be  in  favour  of  independence.  Similarly,  some  very  Taiwanised
mainlanders will unambiguously reject the Chinese political system, but not the option
of future unification, and there is no contradiction here. They do identify with Taiwan
but do not subscribe to an independence that their Chinese consciousness, unlike their
Taiwanese  consciousness,  bars  them  from  thinking  as  legitimate  or  useful.  Which
probably means that, for a doubtless considerable number of Taiwanese (mainlanders
and those  of  Taiwanese  stock),  the  independence/unification faultline  says  nothing
very precise about what they really think. 
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29 Having  a  strong  “Chinese  consciousness”  or  “Taiwanese  consciousness”  does  not
necessarily prejudge a person’s position on independence or on ethnic origins. Thus,
the “consciousness” variable, whether it be Chinese or Taiwanese, is more subtle and
less simplistic; it also explains more. One may identify oneself with Taiwan in everyday
matters but keep, by virtue of one’s parental upbringing and past political socialisation,
a strong Chinese consciousness. Thus, Taiwanese people who speak Taiwanese, being
mainlanders widely Taiwanised in everyday matters and using the Taiwanese language,
will maintain their opposition in principle to independence, and will feel a systematic
mistrust  for  Chen  Shui-bian:  this  would  be  difficult  to  explain  other  than  by  the
significance of this variable.  Alongside rational analyses of a political assessment of
such and such a  variable  (cross-Strait  relations,  for  example),  where  subjectivity  is
strong  but  thinking  remains  rational,  there  exists  among  the  Waishengren  an
opposition  in  principle  to  independence  and  an  adherence  in  principle  (markedly
diminished, however) to the ideal of unification, views that are not properly “rational”
and that spring from the individual’s inherited ethnic identification and from received
political  socialisation.  And often,  speeches that are supposed to explain unification,
ranging from those of the less educated of unification supporters, to those with more
carefully thought out arguments put forward by others, often reveal contradictions.
One  may  encounter  the  logical  fallacy  common  to  many  speeches  by  re-unifiers
throughout the world: “Why is independence not desirable? Because Taiwan is part of
China.” This fallacy is known as petitio principii, or begging the question: a method of
reasoning  that  takes  as  its  argument,  and  holds  as  already  established,  the  very
conclusion  that  it  seeks  to  prove.  Its  use  is  commonplace  among  advocates  of
unification, on both sides of the Strait.
30 Whether you examine the unifiers’ position or that of the independence camp, you very
soon  view  apparent  contradictions  or  political manipulations,  in  a  country  where
emotion has in large part driven reason out of the political debate. This leads to an
unprofitable analysis of the situation. The pro-independence people, for example, often
accuse their opponents of manipulating public opinion. This is largely true of many
politicians  in  the  Blue  camp,  and  the  presidential  election  campaign  this  year  has
demonstrated it to a remarkable degree. But the mainland politicians are also, just like
the  Taiwanese  mainlanders,  grappling  with  their  own pluralistic  identity.  They are
confronted  with  conflicting  notions:  their  identification  with  Taiwan,  which  is
undeniable, the persistence of their political socialisation, and the image of an ideal
China. Are some of the Blues manipulative? Of that there is no doubt; but most of the
mainlanders simply have their heads filled with an emotional ideology—Greater China
—which obliterates their reasoning capacity. This is most evident in the case of the
mainlanders born in Taiwan, who have never been to China, and who consider Taiwan
as  their  “country”  (some  indeed  call  it  guojia),  but  are  in  principle  opposed  to
independence. They justify this position with the argument that it would be likely to
lead to war; but they also say, “... because Taiwan is part of China”. Nothing, other than
the persistence of the teachings of past political socialisation, can explain what, at first
sight, looks like a contradiction.
31 It  is  this  complex  result,  an  always  personal  mixture  of  cultural  and  ethnic
identification and political socialisation, that we call here “Chinese consciousness” and
“Taiwanese consciousness”. These consciousnesses are not exclusive of each other; one
can find them together in an infinite variety of proportions, which go to make up the
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richness of the Taiwanese expression of identity17. The result of this March’s election
does not show, in our view, an opposition between mainlanders and Taiwanese, or a
50-50  split  over  the  questions  of  independence  and  unification  (on  this  point  the
opinion  polls  give  totally  different  results),  or  even  an  opposition  between  a
“mainlander  ideology”  (waishengren  yishi)  and  any  other.  The  result  shows  that
Taiwanese society is split between two visions of Taiwan: one is the fruit of the new
Taiwanese consciousness, and the other is created by the persistence of the Chinese
consciousness.  We should take care to avoid the cut-and-dried conclusion that “the
Taiwanese” do not want independence, or that Taiwanese nationalism is “on the rise”.
But it is true that there are trends. A basic trend—and one that is growing fast over
recent  years  in  Taiwan—is  that  people  describe  their  ethnic  identification  as
Taiwanese,  rather  than  Chinese.  And  while  these  presidential  elections  have  been
fought  over  the  division  between  “Chinese  consciousness”  and  “Taiwanese
consciousness”, judging by the particularly marked increase in the personal vote won
by Chen Shui-bian between 2000 and 2004, we might have here a second obvious trend.
The complexity and fluidity of identification in Taiwan
32 It  is  difficult  to  understand  the  phenomenon  of  opposition  between  “Chinese
consciousness” and “Taiwanese consciousness” without first going more deeply into
the question of identification with the national model. The experience of identity by
the mainlanders in Taiwan is marked, on the one hand, by a conflict between their
identification with Taiwan at an everyday level and, on the other, their reflex vote for
candidates  favouring  unification.  The  Taiwanese  often  consider  that “the
Waishengren” do want unification, and that supporters of unification, often identified,
though misguidedly, with the Waishengren, are ready to sell Taiwan out to China in
order  to  achieve  their  ideal  of  unification  with  the  Chinese  mainland.  These
judgements, shared by the most committed politicians, as by the average Taiwanese,
and the least politicised, have only a partial foundation in truth.
33 In a study lying between political science and social anthropology, aimed at discovering
how the Waishengren really feel for Taiwan as a potential object of identification, we
attempted  to  determine  the  variables  that  might  help  to  measure  statistically  the
phenomenon  of  identification  with  the  national  model.  A  questionnaire  with  178
variables  was  distributed  to  one  thousand  mainlanders  in  Taiwan,  at  a  significant
period,  199718.  This  questionnaire  enabled  us  to  measure  statistically  a  complex,
emotional and sensitive question, one hitherto confined until recently to the fields of
political prejudice and psychological resentment. To highlight this identification with
Taiwan, we employed, among others, the variable of the respondents’ position on the
question of unification between the two sides of the Strait. This question, as we have
said,  is  crucial.  Therefore,  we framed the unification question in two very different
ways, to try and determine whether there was any difference between a position of
principle, theoretical, symbolic and explicit, and a non-political position, one that was
felt  rather  than  spoken,  one  that  was  hardly  measurable  other  than  through  the
comparison of variables: not being verbalised, this position could not, by definition,
appear  as  an  answer  to  a  clear  and  direct  question.  First,  the  question  was  asked
directly: “Do you think that the government of the Republic of China cannot in any
circumstance  compromise  on  the  necessity  of  supporting  the  policy  of  unification
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait?” The second question was put indirectly,
respondents having to rate in order of importance six policies—six possible priorities
for the government—one of  which was unification between the two sides.  The first
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question led us to a surprise: scarcely more than half the respondents (50.3%) declared
they believed so. The way that the question had been framed, though it did push them
towards a clear statement of principle, did not “commit” them beyond the principle:
one might have expected a far higher yes,  in the area of  80%. Less surprising,  and
helping  to  explain  this  50.3%  average,  was  the  generational  phenomenon,  which
showed great  differences  in  the  likelihood  of  a  yes  vote  according  to  people’s  age
groups. The generation born on the mainland recorded 78.3%; the generation born in
Taiwan between 1945 and 1968, 41.7%; and the generation born in Taiwan between 1969
and  1981,  only  34.7%.  The  younger  the  age-group,  the  greater  the  number  of
mainlanders  who  challenge  what  is,  for  the  supporters  of  unification,  an  absolute
imperative. 
34 We found a  surprising  confirmation  of  this  phenomenon when the  answers  to  the
second question were examined. The number of respondents who chose cross-Strait
unification  as  the  government’s  first  desirable  priority,  ahead  of  the  five  other
available  proposals  (reforming  the  administration,  improving  economic  conditions,
battling against dirty money, raising Taiwan’s profile on the international stage and
protecting  the  environment)  was  only  5.4%,  a  particularly  low  figure,  and  one  to
challenge many prejudices. 1.2% put unification second; 1.7% put it in third place; and
only 5.8% put it even fourth. The largest groups of respondents were those who put
unification down as  their  last  but  one priority  or  as  the  last  of  all  the  six  choices
offered:  30%  and  55.6%  respectively.  That  brings  to  85.6%  of  those  mainlanders
approached the number of those considering unification as coming last when compared
with  other,  more  domestic,  political  priorities.  While  that  does  not  mean  that
unification is not a priority for them—it was proposed, like the others, as a possible
priority and was chosen, whatever the rank, by a huge majority—it does appear to be
the first priority for only a tiny minority. Here we had a tangible measurement of their
being rooted in  Taiwan,  a  measurement  confirmed by many other  variables  in  our
questionnaire19.  So  there  is  now,  in  the  configuration  of  the  mainlanders’  national
identification, an evident Taiwanese centre, whose growing importance challenges the
very principle, up to now unassailable, of unification. This is an important element in
the  crisis  mentality  that  drives  the  Blues;  the  unification  objective  among  the
mainlanders themselves is unstable and fragile; and, as the re-unifying ideology runs
out of steam, its very survival comes under threat.
35 Yet,  the  Chinese  pole  of  national  identification  does  not  disappear  as  far  as  the
Waishengren Blue voters are concerned, which puts them in a defensive posture when
faced with the deepening Taiwanisation of political structures. And it would be difficult
for this Chinese pole of identification to disappear: the political socialisation of the past
(being educated under the Nationalists to love China) was intense; the ethnic group
identification persists (the first and second generations of Waishengren tend to keep a
network  of  relationships  with  mainlanders,  an  influence  that  fades  away  among
younger people); and, although important political changes have come about in recent
years, the structure of the government is still the Republic of China, which naturally
helps this identification to linger on. So the national identification of the mainlanders
has  a  twofold  connection;  and,  while  the importance  of  the  Chinese  focus  cannot
prevent people putting down Taiwanese roots,  such roots are not yet deep enough,
particularly  among  those  born  in  China  or  socialised  under  the  dictatorship,  to
challenge  their  ethnic,  cultural  and,  to  some  extent  for  a  few,  quasi-political
identification with China.  The reason why mainlanders  feel  anxious  faced with the
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successive victories of the pro-independence camp is because their identification with
China leads many of them into judgements, founded or unfounded, as to the possibility
and the consequences of independence. 
36 To complete our analysis, we should also evaluate the way in which those of Taiwanese
origin  identify  with  the  national  object.  No-one  could  claim  indeed  that  only
mainlanders voted for Lien Chan and Soong Chu-yu, or were drawn into the protest
movement  that  followed  the  election20.  How  are  we  to  explain  why  middle-class
Taiwanese electors, in the south, speaking Taiwanese at home, considering China to be
another country, vote for Lien Chan and Soong Chu-yu? Discussions with these electors
reveal clearly that at the centre of their concern may be their cares about the economic
situation. The value they set upon the identity debate seems minimal. Their Taiwanese
consciousness, though undeniable, does not persuade them of the need to give a state
to the Taiwanese nation, or a nation to the Taiwanese state—which, for some others, is
a  logical  consequence.  They  reposition  the  debate  around their  personal  economic
situation and incline towards a “neither this nor that” view of Taiwan’s future: they are
afraid of independence but, even so, they do not want unification either—or we could
say: they are afraid of independence, but they disagree with unification. Some of them
have invested in China, and see in the building of a Taiwanese nation, because it leads
to tensions with China, a loss of time, money and energy, a dangerous strategy, and all
the more useless a policy since Taiwan is, in fact, already independent. For all that, it
would for them be out of the question to yield unconditionally to China. 
37 This  view  of  things  naturally  arouses  impatience  among  the  theoreticians  of  the
Taiwanese nation who, as at many earlier moments in history elsewhere in the world,
are in the vanguard of public opinion. They consider that Taiwanese voters supporting
the Blues are deficient in “national consciousness”—a judgement they share with many
nationalists across the world; they think these people are city-dwellers with a petit-
bourgeois  mentality  and,  lastly,  that  they  are  influenced  by  an  over-simplifying
discourse and led astray over the links between identity, economic development and
cross-Strait relations. And it is true that during the last election campaign, the Blues
played systematically on the theme of safety (jiu Taiwan), stressing the “mortal peril” in
which Chen Shui-bian was reputed to place the island.
38 While all nationalists across the world find themselves struggling to close the gap in
consciousness between them and the peoples of the nations they seek to build, it is
precisely because they are nation-builders. The project they advocate is necessarily at
odds  with  the  perceptions  of  the  masses.  And  the  masses,  understandably,  are
primarily concerned with their material situation; Taiwan is no exception to the rule.
There is  a  phenomenon of  predictable  inertia  that  confronts  the pro-independence
camp.
39 What is  more,  the  opposition unifiers  play  on the strong feeling among Taiwanese
people  (always  providing  there  is  peace)  that  the  main  thing  is  the  economy,  the
material  situation.  The  Taiwanese  economy  suffered  the  full  impact  of  the  world
slowdown,  which  coincided  with  Chen  Shui-bian’s  first  term  in  office.  Being
accustomed to growth, the Taiwanese were traumatised by the economic slowdown.
The feeling became widespread that the DPP, lacking much experience of power, was
incompetent.  Many Taiwanese go further in associating the DPP with the economic
setbacks,  because it  seeks  independence;  and they associate  the KMT with stability
because Peking is said to prefer it, even though in other respects they reject the idea of
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Peking’s control over the island. Just so long as the KMT does not propose immediate
unification  and  at  any  price,  many  electors  who  want  neither  independence  nor
unification would prefer a Taiwanised KMT to a DPP that seeks to go further. The KMT
has played heavily on that preference; and the inner meaning of the pan-Blue camp’s
Taiwanese  refrain  “Work  hard  to  save  Taiwan”  (pa-bien  kiu  Taiwan)  is  a  message
designed to refocus the debate on Chen Shui-bian’s economic record.
From defeat to denial of the evidence: the feeling of urgency among the supporters of
unification
40 The Taiwanisation of  the mainlanders  is  certainly  likely  to  challenge how they see
unification, and this induces an element of anxiety among its supporters. However, the
continuing importance of the Chinese pole in the mainlanders’ national identification
scheme is, among them too, a source of renewed anxiety when faced with the DPP’s
accession to power, and then, on its re-election, with the normalisation of its power.
Thus,  it  seems  that  Taiwanisation  and  its  converse  both  contribute  towards
dramatising the issues.
41 The Taiwanisation movement has divided Taiwan’s Chinese nationalists throughout the
decade, ending by causing the defeat of the KMT in 2000. That was a major source of
anxiety for the advocates of unification, as was shown by demonstrations demanding,
and bringing about, the dismissal of Lee Teng-hui from the presidency of the KMT after
Chen Shui-bian’s victory in 2000. But they could still  tell  themselves that Chen had
come to power because Soong Chu-yu and Lien Chan had split the opposition vote; and,
once these two came together on the same presidential ticket in late spring 2003, the
re-conquest  of  power  was  possible.  But  Chen  by  himself,  up  against  these  former
opponents now united, could still  stand up to them. When the Chinese factor made
itself  felt  in the campaign,  with the missiles,  and when Chen Shui-bian proposed a
referendum on the issue of sovereignty, the long-avoided question of identity exploded
into the forefront of the 2004 campaign. Politicians supporting unification hounded
Chen,  whipping  up  an  unusually  violent  campaign:  exaggerating  the  economic
difficulties,  inventing stories  about  social  instability  and crime,  weaving conspiracy
theories  about  the  March  19th  attack,  likening  Chen  to  sinister  twentieth  century
dictators,  making personal  attacks  on his  honesty,  his  intellectual  capacity  and his
personality,  and intimidating voters  by brandishing the Chinese threat  while  citing
contradictions in the independence case (they say they want peace―but building a
Taiwanese nation is a provocation to China), while avoiding any thorough examination
of the problem as a whole (is China’s attitude legitimate? How much pure rhetoric is
there in the Chinese threats? Should they really side with China simply because the
electoral logic pushes them to create a distance between themselves and the party in
power?),  while  ignoring  their  own  contradictions  (for  example,  countering  the
proposed defence referendum by declaring that China had “only” 496 missiles trained
on Taiwan).
42 A full-scale alarmist rhetoric has finally been deployed. To the slogan of the Lien-Soong
ticket (“Work hard to save Taiwan”) was added in big letters over the KMT (Central
Standing  Committee’s  Headquarters)  in  Taipei,  the  slogan  “Change  Starts  Now”
(gaibian, cong xianzai kaishi), then “Change, to Have Hope” (gaibian, jiu you xiwang). It was
necessary to “Save Taiwan” from a “Dictator”, from “Economic Ruin”, and from the
direct threat of the “Disappearance of the Country” (of the Republic of China).  The
Blues made numerous comparisons between Chen Shui-bian and Adolf Hitler, while one
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electoral poster pointed out that Bin Laden’s choice or Saddam Hussein’s preference
was for Chen. The candidate for Vice-President, Soong Chu-yu, declared himself a few
days after the televised debate between the two candidates for the presidency: “Mr
Chen Shui-bian says that he has never changed his hair-style. Hitler never changed his
moustache,  either.”  The  description  of  Chen  Shui-bian  as  a  dictator  was  directly
repeated in numerous speeches and electoral rallies, right up until the warning issued
by a lecturer at Taiwan University, Chu Yun-peng, also a mainlander, on the eve of
polling day: “Chen Shui-bian has already brought a legal action against the press. Have
we ever heard of a democratic leader taking the press to court? If Chen Shui-bian is re-
elected, he will bring back dictatorship and muzzle the media”21. These accusations are,
in fact, simply in the line of those made by the unifying New Party during the 1990s
against Lee Teng-hui, accusing him of being a dictator even as the democratic reforms
were going ahead, and with them the identity transition that destroyed any illusions
that unification might be a prospect for the near future.
43 The extreme nature of these remarks is such that one can see in them as much the
product of sharp anxiety as of any calculated manipulation of information. In a letter
addressed a week after the elections to Washington’s representative in Taipei, Barbara J
Schrage, some of Lien’s supporters ended an emotional tirade against Chen Shui-bian
with  the  words:  “We  w[ill] always  remember  him  as  the  murderer  of  Taiwan’s
democracy on March 19” (the date of the assassination attempt). In the letter, they
draw attention to lies by the Secretary General of the Presidency, Chiou I-jen who, they
said,  dragged  up  the  theory  of  a  “conspiracy  between  the  opposition  party  and
mainland China”. We followed his statement live, but we have no memory of any such
comment. One can see in this, doubtless, an interesting phenomenon with each side
accusing the other of being manipulators.
44 We should mention, to finish, the televised intervention of Sisy Chen, an independent
politician who has for a long time been in the DPP camp and has become very critical of
Chen  Shui-bian.  On  the  evening  of  the  attack  on  him,  she  appeared  on  television,
declaring “It’s all fake; this is a plot; I have the proof”. However, she was never able to
provide it. A month later, confronted with the row over the affair, she admitted, “I am
not responsible for my words,” adding, “I based myself on information that the KMT
had passed to  me,  with the full  knowledge of  Lien Chan.”  Her intervention on the
evening of the assassination attempt had likely been decided upon as an emergency
response  to  the  first  opinion  polls  after  the  attack,  which  indicated  an  emotional
reaction by voters in favour of Chen Shui-bian.
45 As for the theme of the destruction of Taiwan’s political system, this was used right up
to the very last day by the Blue camp: while on the day of the elections any political
advertisements in the media were forbidden by law, the Lien-Soong camp published a
half-page  advert  on  the  front  pages  of  the  island’s  main  newspapers:  against  the
background of the colours of the Republic’s flag was printed the slogan, “We can never
let this flag disappear from the surface of the earth!”, exploiting fears that they had
stirred up in the electorate over the preceding months.
A feeling of panic
46 The anxiety felt by conservative mainlanders, their difficulty in accepting the changes
in progress, and the repeated manipulation by politicians supporting unification and
seeking  to  hang  onto  their  electoral  support  have  led  to  record-high  emotional
investment. As in 2000, mainlanders who would ordinarily pass unnoticed have been
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claiming themselves convinced that newly elected Taiwanese would one day come to
“assassinate” them. This kind of talk is completely out of step with reality, in a civil
society  that  remained calm  even  during  the  protest  demonstrations.  It  reflects  a
morbid fantasy, which outrageously anticipates a revenge campaign by the islanders.
Indeed, the mainlanders have a guilty conscience, and are trying to conceal it: for fifty
years they lent their support to a dictatorial regime maintained with an iron hand by a
minority from outside, one that had colonised Taiwan and crushed its cultures. They,
the small minority of mainlanders, who had arrived in rags, with a charismatic but
defeated  leader...  Their  outburst  this  year  has  its  origins  in  a  deep  emotional
indebtedness  going  back  to  the  traumatic  conditions  of  their  arrival  in  the  1949
debacle. This emotional investment, with its doom-laden tendency, explains why the
tears shed on losing the election were an indication less of a disappointment over the
result than of a deep anxiety about the future.
47 The local Blue leaders, whom we interviewed the day before the election and on polling
day, in Taipei, Tainan and Kaohsiung, recognised the risks of rioting within their camp
in the event of defeat, and for a good reason: they had themselves intensely mobilised
the troops for a decisive election. In the advert they published on polling day, you can
also read these very significant words, that we would certainly not hear in Western
democracies:  “Great people,  today you must make a decisive choice”. Yet,  despite a
dangerous emotional saturation, the Blue camp’s chiefs have poured oil on the fire at
the most crucial moment, immediately after their condemnation of the voting results.
They did this knowingly, taking turns one after another, day and night, for weeks on
end, lavishing food and drink on the demonstrators along Kaitagelan Avenue in Taipei,
to keep them there for as  long as possible and in the largest  numbers.  They acted
deliberately in a situation that was known to be explosive. Panic then took over among
a  considerable  number  of  mainlanders,  who  lost  in  the  frenzy  of  defeat  the  most
elementary capacity to see what was coming; this in turn led them to believe in the
least credible of conspiracy theories such as those circulating about the March 19th
attack22.
48 More than a month after the election, the unifiers were still consumed by a complete
“belief  system” in  which  every  event,  every  declaration,  every  political  action  was
systematically interpreted within the model of a generalised conspiracy by the Greens
aimed at “making China disappear” (qu Zhongguohua) from Taiwanese culture, and at
“driving the mainlanders into the sea”. For weeks after the election, some mainlanders
saw  civil  war  all  around  them,  whereas  Taiwan  is  at  peace.  Locked  into  a  siege
mentality,  they  felt  themselves  threatened  with  physical  and  political  annihilation
whereas, apart from a few fundamentalists among the pro-independence militants, no
one is thinking of throwing them out.
49 Worryingly, this emotional tide has affected this time the young mainlanders, those
among whom Taiwanisation has been shown to be natural. This is a new phenomenon.
At one moment, a very close mainlander friend insulted us as we were taking a photo of
an  anti-Lee  Teng-hui  slogan  posted  over  the  KMT  Party  Headquarters.  At  another
moment, a mainlander acquaintance threw in the dustbin all her green clothes saying
she could not stand them any more, while another woman reassured herself that some
magazine was on her side when she saw that its cover was mainly blue. Another man
was sorry that his favourite tea was green tea: in the space of a few weeks, the word
had become an obsession. Many of the mainlanders think that the sinister period of the
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“white terror” during the 1950s (baise kongbu) is now being repeated in the form of a
“green terror” (lüse kongbu), from which they will not physically escape. In the history
of  the  mainlanders  in  Taiwan,  there  have  been  only  two  precedents  for  such  an
atmosphere: the transfer to Taiwan of the main contingent of mainlanders fleeing from
the Communists in 1949-50, and the anxieties felt over the death of Chiang Ching-kuo
in January 1988 and over his replacement by the first Taiwanese President in history,
Lee Teng-hui. 
50 The  only  positive  consequence,  perhaps,  of  this  traumatic  atmosphere  is  the  high
turnout recorded for the Presidential election: 80.2%. Tens of thousands of Taiwanese
living abroad came home to vote. On polling day, all the planes on domestic routes and
all the trains leaving Taipei were overbooked, and both the north-south motorways
were crammed with traffic. Old people went to vote in their wheel-chairs, sick people
carrying their drips, and invalids with relatives helping them to place their votes in the
ballot-boxes.  A woman writing into one of  the island’s  main dailies  explained that,
having been stuck for hours in a motorway traffic-jam, she had arrived at her polling-
station a few minutes after it closed, and had burst into tears of despair. Everyone knew
for months in advance that each vote would count, that the vote would be close. This
was the consequence of what was uniquely at stake in this election. Following the start
of  the  protests,  we  could  see  elder  mainlanders  asking  the  way  so  as  to  join  the
demonstrations. One of them, an old woman, said to us, “You understand, I haven’t
been back to Taiwan for twenty years: I don’t recognise anything.” Born in China, she
had lived in Taiwan for a few years only, had emigrated a generation ago, had kept her
Republic of China passport, had never had much connection with the island, but had
come back to vote for this “very serious decision”: keeping Chen Shui-bian from being,
she thought, the last President of the Republic of China.
51 It  is easy to understand what an intense shock the losers have suffered. We should
distinguish,  however,  in  the Blues’  reaction,  between the understandable  feeling of
frustration  brought  about  by  so  narrow  a  defeat,  and  Lien  Chan’s  immediate
politicisation of the results that signalled his defeat: “an unfair election”, “an invalid
result” (dangxuan wuxiao), some “abnormal phenomena having taken place during the
vote” and an assassination attempt of which he suggested (having the previous day
declared his compassion for the victim) that Chen Shui-bian had orchestrated it and
would now refuse  an enquiry  because  he  had something to  hide.  Was not  this  the
endless harping on about conspiracy theory, in a camp that sees its marginalisation
ever deepening?
52 A  “bifurcation  in  history”  happened  with  Lien  Chan’s  declaration,  as  often  with
political declarations that have a tremendous importance on the subsequent course of
events. He could simply have declared that the voting margin was so narrow that a
recount was needed. Everyone would have understood, and the losers would probably
have  calmed  down  while  waiting  for  the  revised  result.  Lien  chose  the  opposite
strategy,  refusing  to  play  according to  the  rules  and  fulminating  against
embezzlements and plots. Was the election unfair? The term is not constitutional, and
has no legal meaning; it is a political interpretation. If the KMT had won, would it have
denounced  the  election  as  unfair?  And  why  condemn  irregularities  on  the
announcement of its defeat without being able to furnish any proof, whereas, during
the day, all the television channels had filmed the voting without finding anything to
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complain about from when the polls opened at 08:00 to when they closed at 16:00 under
the supervision of representatives from each party?
Conspiracy, plot, conjuration... The oldest of explanations?
53 Allegations  about  a  conspiracy  have  become  a  tradition  over  these  past  years  in
Taiwan. Ever since a Taiwanese President came to power in 1988, and since they ceased
to be the dominant force (zhuliu) in Taiwan in the early 1990s, the conservatives of the
reunifying,  Nationalist  movement  have  endlessly  rehashed  conspiracy  theories  in
various forms to try and counter a revolution that, in effect, was to change profoundly
the nature of Taiwan’s institutions, ideology and identity. Since 2000, having become
the political opposition but remained the legislative majority23, they have not played
the role of a constructive opposition but resorted to what is known in Constitutional
law as “legislative filibustering”, or obstructing the government’s programme by all
means: cutting budgets, stripping legal reforms of their content, refusing to authorise
extraordinary  sessions;  this  has  certainly  not  helped  the  pro-independence
government to introduce its reforms. Ever since Chiang Kai-shek unified the China of
the warlords in 1927, the KMT had had no experience of opposition. 
54 This provides us with a partial reply to the question of why, if their identification is
already pluralistic, do most mainlanders choose the Chinese element in their identity
when they come to vote, rather than the Taiwanese element. Fear, partly justified (by
China’s  verbal  threats)  and partly  unjustified (because of  doubts  as  to  whether the
Chinese have the real capacity to carry out these threats, at least now), as well as the
anti-Waishengren chauvinism of many pro-independence militants, inevitably give the
Waishengren the feeling that independence is the most dangerous solution, and that
they would not have any place in a Taiwanese nation-state. This feeling of fear, faced
with  Taiwan’s  political  development,  is  to  a  large  extent  emotional:  it  is,  for  that
reason, all the more easily manipulated. This disorientation before the utter change to
their  landmarks, this  fantasy  about  their  own  disappearance,  and  the  ethnicist
discourse of some pro-independence militants who endlessly “victimise” them: all this
explains their  natural  reflex to vote for mainlander and Blue candidates,  an ethnic
reflex where it occurs, which is not shared by those of Taiwanese origin. This is how the
Blue camp survives, its unifying discourse being more and more in contradiction with
the fact that most of its members, including its leaders, now identify with Taiwan.
55 But  we  are  dealing  with  the  logic  of  democratic  elections,  and  its  principle  is
arithmetical:  winning  as  many  votes  as  possible.  This  logic,  which  leads  to
electioneering and populism in many modern democracies, has led the Blue camp to a
simple  strategy  faced  with  its  delicate situation:  the  manipulation―conscious,
systematic and immoderate in the light of Taiwan’s real situation―of the anxieties of
the mainland population, disoriented because it is in the process of indigenisation, and
of the Taiwanese people just coming out of a historic economic recession. Here, the
unification supporters have used their last card: fear. Nevertheless, there are quite a
few  analysts  who  denounce  the  DPP  as  a  risk  factor,  while  seeing  in  the  KMT  a
guarantee  of  stability—when it  is  really  on  the  brink  of  collapse,  and  now putting
everything at stake to survive.
Risks
56 Playing politics at the lowest level risks effecting everyone concerned, starting with the
Blue camp, in undesirable ways. Many of its militants have been destabilised by the
demonstrations, by their violence, exaggerations and lies, and by the image created of
The Supporters of Unification and the Taiwanisation Movement
China Perspectives, 53 | May- June 2004
19
Taiwanese democracy. Similarly, faced with the possibility of a Green victory in the
legislative elections later this year, many candidates standing under the KMT banner,
those of local and Taiwanese stock, may be tempted to leave the Nationalist Party to
join the Greens, as has regularly occurred in the past. If an extensive movement in this
direction  were  to  develop,  it  would  signal  one  more  departure  from  the  KMT  of
politicians in the “Taiwanese camp”; this would certainly leave the Blues more unified,
but would also push them towards an ideological repositioning in a direction that their
leaders do not all wish to follow, and which would further diminish their appeal.
57 The strategy of the Blue camp also carries a risk for the Greens. If the attitude of the
Blues  led  the  KMT into  collapsing during the  forthcoming legislative  elections,  the
Greens would then lose an enemy whose ideological contradictions, internal divisions
and growing electoral weakness are so many aces to keep them in power, even under
fire from politicised criticism. The disappearance of such an enemy would leave them
vulnerable to damage caused by their own divisions24.
 
An election day poster of the pan-blue camp proclaims  that the flag of the Republic of China must
not disappear from the face of the earth. In compliance with the law, candidates’ names are not
mentioned
© Stéphane Corcuff
58 The fear card, lastly, puts China in a tricky position. Caught between the devil and the
deep blue sea by the demonstrations, Peking finally declared that it might intervene if
things  turned  out  badly,  at  the  moment  when  the  demonstrations  in  front  of  the
Central Election Commission were threatening to degenerate, with the first signs of
physical violence in Taipei. The next day, a cadre of Soong Chu-yu’s People First Party,
trying to  contain the violence while  encouraging the mobilisation,  told  the excited
militants: “China was only bluffing; [...] it’s impossible that it would interfere in our
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affairs.” A re-unifier was announcing, by the same token, that what the Blues had been
brandishing for years was, to some extent, an imaginary sword.
59 But the most troubling question is what idea some segments of the Taiwanese society
may now have of democracy. Many people now doubt whether Taiwan’s democracy is
really healthy, and some even wonder whether the democratic principle is justified.
More seriously  even,  young people  in  Taiwan generally  feel  a  profound disgust  for
politics and the spectacle that has been made of it, particularly during this campaign.
Not  having  personal  memories  of  dictatorship,  the  only  reference  they  have  is  a
democracy that is increasingly challenged by a radicalised question of identity. Their
disgust has little in common with the disaffection that young people in other countries
feel towards politics, and, should it continue that way, it may not bode well for the
future  of  the  democratic  idea  in  Taiwan.  Lastly,  what  one  can  discern  behind  the
opposition of some of the unifiers towards Chen Shui-bian is nothing less than their
fledgling? support for the democratic principle. Indeed, some of them have been slow
to accept the democratic  process,  having been forced into it  by Lee Teng-hui.  This
paradox of a democratic leader forcing conservatives to accept democracy and, for this,
using his wide powers within the KMT is easy to understand: Lee Teng-hui was well
aware that democratisation within the KMT would be dangerous for his democratic
reforms across the whole society, because it would curtail his power to change things
faced with the conservatives. Thus was born their accusation that Lee Teng-hui was a
dictator, because he was using all the powers that the presidency of the KMT gave him
to limit those of the mainlanders supporting unification, and promoting the reforms
that  were  destabilising  them.  The  support  of  these  unification  supporters  for  the
current political system is permanently weakened by the combination of democratic
reforms and the changing of the national identity: the one could not succeed without
the other. What appears clearly since then is that, from the moment when democracy
allows the people, the media or the politicians to question the legitimacy of the ideal of
unification with China, the support of some Blues for the democratic principle begins
to vacillate. For Taiwan’s democracy, this might again be a worry for the future.
The bitter taste of democracy
60 The politicians of the Blue camp were for decades at the heart of a state-party, one of
the most tightly-knit in the world. First, being radically opposed to independence, they
found themselves watching Lee Teng-hui marginalising their power within the KMT.
Then the unbelievable happened before their very eyes: the independence party came
to power, putting the KMT into opposition for the first time. The policy begun by Lee
Teng-hui  has  since  been taken even further,  and  the  candidate  Chen has  been re-
elected to sole power ahead of his two main opponents. We are bound to wonder what
feelings they may have today towards a system that has allowed this process; for it is
precisely by playing the democratic game that they have lost power.
61 Very early on, the leaders of the Nationalist Party opposed to Lee Teng-hui realised
that he was going to change things irreversibly. In 1990, he was elected by a whisker as
the KMT’s official candidate for President. In 1993, the party split with the formation of
the  New  Party,  dominated  by  the  opponents  of  the  KMT’s  new  leader.  Then,  on
December  9th  1995,  Lin  Yang-kang  and  Hau  Po-tsun,  vice-presidents  of  the  KMT,
published an “Open Letter to the Party Comrades” in the Central Daily News (Zhongyang
ribao),  the party organ. They declared to everyone, “Lee Teng-hui has the ingenuity
(xinji) to destroy the Party and betray the country.” Lee was at that time head of the
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KMT and serving President of the Republic... But their opposition, while it was explicit
and  fierce,  always  remained  within  the  legal  limits.  One  can  understand  how  this
democracy might have a bitter taste for them: the democratic process was imposed on
them by Lee;  they played the game, even reluctantly:  which ended by allowing the
opposition pro-independence party to come to power, and to hang onto it. This is one
of  the  major  reasons  why  they  hate  Lee  Teng-hui  so  fiercely,  to  an  extent  that  is
somewhat  hard  to  realise  outside  of Taiwan,  with  classical  democratic  standards.
Psychology explains this, and shows again why political science cannot avoid taking it
into consideration into its analyses.
A choice between democracy and identity?
62 Taiwanese campaigners for independence question whether the politicians of the Blue
camp identify with Taiwan. But in a political context that marginalises the unifiers, the
question lies elsewhere: how can they now avoid political extinction, faced with the
democratic process?
63 Their ambiguity towards democracy dates in fact further back than this election. It has
even been there for a long time: at least since 1991, when Lee Teng-hui introduced
reforms designed to lead to the re-election of the assemblies elected in 1947 in Taiwan
and on the mainland. Lee chose this as the first great reform of his programme because,
although it  was a sensitive matter,  it  was the one most urgently and self-evidently
needed. Yet, the conservatives desperately opposed it because it led to re-election of
the assemblies on the only territory that Taipei controlled, so challenging the principle
of representing the whole of China in the assemblies of the Republic. The same debate
reoccurred in 1994 during the constitutional  reforms leading to the election of  the
President of  the Republic  of  China,  no longer by the National  Assembly but by the
Taiwanese  people  voting  in  direct  universal  suffrage:  this  made  Lee,  in  fact,  the
President of Taiwan.
64 Once a pro-independence President had come to power, as the Blues’ anxieties were
becoming real, they attempted in autumn 2000 to use the constitutional mechanism of
impeachment against Chen Shui-bian, on the pretext of a political disagreement over
the question of the fourth nuclear power station. Whatever may have been the terms of
the debate,  this  was  a  challenge to  the  political  responsibility  of  the  head of  state
whereas,  in  constitutional  logic,  the  head  of  state  has  no  such  responsibility  in  a
parliamentary or presidential system, unlike the Prime Minister assuming there is one.
The Blues, by manipulating a procedure that constitutional theory prescribes only as a
sanction against high treason, risks giving the impression that they are not troubled by
democratic  principles,  being  ready  when  political  questions  are  uppermost,  to
compromise with respect for the Constitution. Now this is a vital point, for it is from
this respect, purely voluntary and unforced, that the Constitution draws its strength as
the supreme legal text,  thus stabilising a constitutional democracy. That is just one
more threat to the future of democracy in Taiwan.
65 More recently, the Blues’ attitude to a referendum shows the same ambiguities: they
are  particularly  troubled by  the  idea  that  a  referendum might  one day be  used to
validate the island’s independence and its change of name; in autumn 2003 they made
every effort to block the adoption of such a law, even though it had been prescribed by
the Constitution in 1947 and had been the dearest wish of the man they see as the
father of their nation, Sun Yat-sen. They were embarrassed by this contradiction and
finally promised to vote for the law; but they amended it as far as possible so as to strip
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it  of  any  substance.  Here  again,  when  democracy  provides  a  tool  suitable  for
challenging the dogma of an “imperative unification”,  their  support for democratic
reform  weakens,  even  disappears.  It  is  in  the  light  of  this  trait  in  their  political
psychology that one can better understand the Blues’ difficulty in accepting, on March
20th 2004, the verdict of the ballot box. No proof has ever been brought in support of
Lien  Chan’s  allegations  on  the  evening  of  his  defeat,  to  the  extent  that  a  curious
agreement was proposed by the Blues two weeks after the start of the demonstrations:
they offered to withdraw some of their complaints in exchange for an assurance that
they would not have to give proof of the irregularities they had alleged.
66 One can now wonder: what is the future of Taiwanese democracy when such deals are
proposed  by  one  camp  and  accepted  by  the  other?  What  influence  do  Taiwanese
politicians have on the Taiwanese people, with their discourse of disinformation? Once
the crisis is over, but with the crisis mentality lingering on, are we to fear new, more
radical  developments,  once  the  nativisation  policy  gets  even  closer  to  a  quasi-
declaration  of  formal  independence?  Basically  optimistic  and  always  cheerful,  the
former President Lee Teng-hui told us, on the day after the election, of his “confidence
in the Taiwanese people,  who will  not  allow themselves  to  be  fooled”.  Yet,  we are
obliged to point out that a great number of Blue militants are convinced that Chen
Shui-bian, who has been awarded two international prizes for his work as a reformer
and for his commitment to the defence of human rights, is a dictator. The psychological
divorce between the Blues and the Greens cannot lead to a real ethnic conflict precisely
because it  does not  follow the ethnic  faultlines;  but  it  creates  a  similarity  between
Taiwanese society today and French society at the height of the Dreyfus affair. There is
no guarantee that some new element might not one day throw Taiwan into turmoil. Are
not the accusations flung at Chen Shui-bian a mere psychological diversion, or do the
anxieties  of  some  key  people  go  so  far  as  to  water  down  their  support  for  the
democratic principle? Are they already torn between their civic allegiance and their
ethnic  identification?  There  might  be  no  explicit  answer  to  this  question  at  this
moment, but the question is nevertheless legitimate. Let us just hope that it will remain
a purely theoretical question.
NOTES
1. In 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo permitted the formation, illegal at the time, of
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, Minjindang). Fourteen years later, in 2000, the
DPP came to power.
2. The Blue camp groups together the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo Guomindang
or Kuomintang), the People’s Party (Qinmindang) and the New Party (Xindang), the last
two being formed from breakaway factions of the first at the time when it was headed
by Lee Teng-hui, whose policies displeased the reunification supporters.
3. The Pan-Green Coalition consists of the Democratic Progressive Party (Minjindang)
and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng), founded by Lee Teng-hui
after his resignation in March 2000 from the presidency of the KMT.
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4. The representative form of democracy, as tried out by the founding fathers of the
American Constitution and by French and British liberals, was in part invented in order
to legitimise the transition from rule by one person to rule by an elite. This elite, by
concentrating power in its own hands, prevents it falling into the hands of the whole
population, for fear both of the difficulty of putting direct democracy into practice and
of where it might lead to. The exercise of representative democracy is entrusted to an
oligarchy, democratically elected but in practice having all power at its disposal: it is
the effect of passing from the principle of popular sovereignty to the practice of what is
called “national” sovereignty.
5. On this subject, readers might consult our article “L’introspection han à Formose. 
L’affaire des manuels scolaires. Connaître Taiwan, 1994-1997”, Etudes chinoises, vol. XX (1-2),
spring-autumn 2001, pp. 41-84.
6. By the end of this new term of office, the presidency will have been held
continuously by native-born Taiwanese for twenty years. Vice-President Lee Teng-hui,
after stepping in as acting President after the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in
1988 (1988-1990), was elected President of the Republic by the National Assembly
(1990-1996) and then, after the Constitution was reformed in 1994, was directly elected
by universal suffrage for a second term, this time of four years (1996-2000). Lee, being
himself of Taiwanese origin, was President of a pro-unification Chinese Nationalist
Party; however, his policy was to insist on the need for focusing political action and
identification on Taiwan itself, and for putting off reunification with China until more
realistic times. After leaving the Presidency of both the Republic and the Chinese
Nationalist Party in 2000 he displayed far more openly his preference for independence
and may be considered today as having played a central role in the building of the
Taiwanese nation. As for Lee’s successor, Chen Shui-bian, elected in 2000 and re-elected
in 2004, he came to power with an explicitly pro-independence identity from the start.
In 2002 he was elected President of the DPP. Both men regularly collaborate today in
promoting the Taiwanese identity.
7. The very extensive powers wielded in Taiwan by Presidents Chiang Kai-shek
(1950-1975) and Chiang Ching-kuo (1978-1988) were derived, not from the Constitution
which, on the contrary, seriously curtailed them, but from their personal standing
within the regime and from the notorious exceptional decrees (dongyuan panluan linshi
tiaokuan), which suspended the constitutional functioning of the state. Lee Teng-hui
cancelled these Temporary Dispositions in 1991 and thus deprived himself, by putting
constitutional government back on the rails, of these extensive powers.
8. Very few, indeed, have denounced the KMT’s suppression, over forty years, of the
linguistic identity and the local culture of the island. Sometimes even they contributed
directly to it in the context of their official functions: as did Soong Chu-yu, vice-
presidential candidate in 2004 and fierce critic of Chen Shui-bian, during the seven
years he spent as Vice-Head then as Head of the Government Information Office
(1977-1984).
9. On this subject, see paragraphs 722-755 of our doctoral thesis, Une identification
plurielle. Les Continentaux et la transition identitaire à Taiwan, 1988-1997, Institut d’études
politiques de Paris, 2000, vol. III, pp. 618-643. 
10. Sovereignty discourse in Taiwan is, indeed, a product of very specific conditions: a
democratic system, one that makes its own choice of head of state, that is independent
in fact but not recognised as such internationally and that is under threat from its
neighbour. The island nationalism produced by Taiwanese democracy in these
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conditions is, in this case, feeble. Still too weak for the pro-independence side,
necessarily too strong for the supporters of unification, it does not display the features
of an exclusive ethnic nationalism, at least in its present governmental expression,
aiming on the contrary to achieve a civic nationalism to include all the ethnic and
cultural components of the island.
11. Between the return of Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek’s China on October 25th 1945 and
the final great evacuation, early in 1955, of an area controlled by the Nationalists, the
Tachen Islands.
12. “Taiwan’s ‘mainlanders’, a new ethnic category”, China Perspectives, No. 28, March-
April 2000, pp 71-81.
13. Young people of mainland descent left these ethnic and geographical “isolat” (a
French anthropological word meaning a small group of persons with relatively few
contacts with extraneous populations) where, for decades, servicemen from the
mainland had been living in cramped conditions.
14. For people to switch from one camp to the other is not impossible, nor even very
rare, although it is not common: we know of former adherents of unification ending by
accepting the principle of independence, and former advocates of independence ending
by opposing the present policy. In the first case, independence is accepted as a
temporary distancing from China to preserve democracy on the island. In the second,
the preservation of the Republic of China is eventually defended to prevent the pro-
independence activists from moving too quickly, and precipitating a crisis in the Strait
that would harm both democracy itself and their own hopes for independence.
15. The phrase “identity debate” that we have used earlier is perhaps best adapted to
translating this conflict between two “consciousnesses”.
16. In Chinese, the phrase meaning ideology (yishi xingtai) includes the word for
conscience (yishi).
17. There are, however, individuals located at the two extremities of the spectrum.
Their judgements, reactions and interpretations are easy to foresee; they tend to be
clearly polarised over the questions of independence and unification; and therefore
such individuals are the candidates best equipped to stand for the one or the other.
18. Ten years after martial law was lifted, President Lee Teng-hui was in full possession
of power and could thus introduce some bold reforms. It was also a year when
psychological tension reached a high point in the decade, notably because of a hard-
won constitutional reform. The government of Taiwan province had by now become
superfluous, the Republic of China having been confined since 1949 mainly to that same
province: it was converted into a mere commission, of only symbolic importance.
19. See our essay Feng he ri nuan. Taiwan Waishengren yu guojia rentong de zhuanbian
(Light Wind, warm sun. Taiwan’s mainlanders and the national identity transition),
Taipei, Yunchen wenhua, 2004, 158 pp. Readers who do not read Chinese but who read
French might consult volume two of our above-mentioned doctoral thesis.
20. No scientific study has yet been done on those of Taiwanese stock. Because they are
not a close-knit minority, but a majority composed of various communities, how is one
to choose, across the whole island, a representative sample, especially if one wishes to
retain our principle of an approach to national identification based on a large number
of variables? The perceptions that follow are not, therefore, based on a statistical study.
They derive from practical experience in the field.
21. Presentation made to international observers and foreign journalists in the offices
of the KMT research foundation in Taipei, on March 19th.
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22. Suggesting, for instance, that an imitation bullet had been fired from inside the car,
and that the holed windscreen had been a mock-up, prepared in advance.
23. Firstly by themselves until 2001, then in the context of a coalition. In the present
legislature, which will stand down on November 30th 2004, the Blues are one vote short
of an absolute majority, and thus depend on one independent vote, which does allow
room for debating but assures them of a majority in many cases.
24. For this reason, Lee Teng-hui’s political forces and the party that he founded, the
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) seemed after the Presidential election quite hesitant
about inviting these Blue politicians to join them in the Green camp; but the TSU’s
strategists were considering it by the time this paper was written.
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